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SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
Suretyship
When a debtor fails to make the payment due, the guarantor
must satisfy the obligation." In such event the guarantor or
surety is subrogated by operation of law to all the rights and re-
courses which the creditor had.2 In Keller v. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation3 the creditor held the debtor's promissory
note and the certificate of title of the automobile on which there
was a chattel mortgage. When the guarantor paid the defaulted
debt he attached a written request that the note and the certifi-
cate of title be forwarded to him. By inadvertence the creditor
marked the note paid and mailed it along with the certificate of
title to the original debtor. The latter sold the car to an inno-
cent purchaser, delivering the cancelled note and the title cer-
tificate along with the car. In the present suit by the guarantor,
the court granted recovery against the creditor.
The judgment is right, but the rationale gives cause to re-
flect. The court stated that after the creditor's inadvertent
error of delivering the note and certificate to the debtor, "re-
sponsibility for taking legal action to prevent injury rested pri-
marily on GMAC, for the difficulty was caused solely by its
negligent act."4 Then the court concluded that "having failed to
perform this obligation GMAC must reimburse the plaintiff the
amount which he expended."'5 The tenor of these words strikes
almost the note of tort language, whereas the underlying legal
principle involved is the surety's right of subrogation. When a
creditor does anything - negligently or otherwise - to reduce
or destroy the surety's rights of subrogation, he is to that extent
held responsible to the surety.6
Pledge
The utilization of movable things as security for credit has
been developed in the civil law in the institution of pledge. Part
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CviL ODE art. 3035 (1870).
2. Id. arts. 2161, 3052, 3053.
3. 96 So.2d 598 (La. 1957).
4. Id. at 600.
5. Ibid.
6. LA. Crv CoDE art. 3061 (1870) ; Provan v. Percy, 11 La. Ann. 179 (1856).
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of this development included as an essential requirement that the
things pledged must be delivered into the physical possession of
the creditor.7 By way of attenuation of this rule, delivery may
be made to a third person agreed upon by the parties.8 In the
Roman law, there were two basic patterns of real security:
pignus (pledge) in which the debtor was necessarily dispossessed
of his property, movable or immovable; and hypotheca (mort-
gage) in which the debtor was not dispossessed of his property,
movable or immovable. The former came to be used essentially
for movables, the latter for immovables; and that is how they
were carried forward into the modern civil codes.
The limitations in the use of pledge, with dispossession of the
debtor, brought about in Louisiana the adoption and expansion
of the chattel mortgage as an appropriate institution to utilize
movables as security without dispossession of the debtor. A
more difficult problem confronts other jurisdictions which re-
fuse to accept the chattel mortgage device as such but seek to
achieve similar results in other ways.
It is regrettable in Louisiana to find situations in which the
requirement of delivery is squeezed dry of any significance in
order to make the institution of pledge fit a given fact situation.
There have been decisions upholding the validity of a pledge
where delivery was made to an employee of the debtor,9 and
there has also been the self-contradictory language asserting that
delivery may be made to the debtor himself provided his tenure
be precarious and clearly for the account of the creditor. 10 These
expressions do not make it right, for their result is to defeat the
nature of pledge which is predicated upon the dispossession of
the debtor.
Accordingly, the decision in Scott v. Corkernn is a move in
the wrong direction because the court treated as valid the pledge
of a life insurance policy in the physical possession of the debtor.
Although he did no act inconsistent with the pledge agreement,
there was nothing to show that he could not have done so. There
was nothing to characterize his tenure as precarious; there was
7. LA. CIVIL CODi arts. 3152, 3162 (1870).
8. Id. art. 3162, in fine.
9. Jacquet v. His Creditors, 38 La. Ann. 863 (1888), cited in Scott v. Cor-
kern, 231 La. 368, 377, 91 So.2d 569, 572 (1056).
10. Bee language in Conger v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 1250 (1880), cited
in Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 377, 91 So.2d 569, 572 (1956).
11. 231 La. 88, 91 So.2d 569 (1956).
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nothing to show conclusively that it was for the account of the
creditor. At the time of the pledge agreement, there had been
an actual delivery of the policy to the creditor. Five years after
the death of the creditor, the debtor died and the policy was
found in his bank box. There was no evidence as to how the pol-
icy got back to the debtor. The court indulged in the presump-
tion that this "possession of the pledgor was precarious or as
agent pro hac vice"'12 and accordingly found "the pledge to have
been presumptively extant between the parties."'1 A footnote by
the court that the delivery requirement "is not applicable as be-
tween the parties to the pledge"' 4 is not supported by any au-
thority. Civil Code Article 3162 does say that "in no case does
this privilege subsist on the pledge, except when the thing...
has been actually put and remained in the possession of the cred-
itor, or of a third person agreed on by the parties." However,
this is not inconsistent with Civil Code Article 3152, which
states that "it is essential to the contract of pledge that the cred-
itor be put in possession of the thing." The inference that deliv-
ery is required only for the subsistence of the privilege is un-
warranted. 5
Concededly, the chattel mortgage act has certain limitations.
It can be used only for corporeal things and there must be com-
pliance with requirements of form and recordation. Many cen-
turies ago, the Romans had a complete pattern of institutions so
that either movables or immovables could be used as security
with or without dispossession of the debtor. Certain parts fell
into disuse. In very recent times, with changes in the economy
and practice, some of the civil code countries are finding a need
for the use of movables as a security device without dispossession
of the debtor. The problem is one that calls for comprehensive
study and perhaps ingenuity. It hardly seems to be the best
answer to distort pledge with the fiction of delivery and dispos-
session where they do not exist.
Privilege for Expenses of Preservation (Storage)
Civil Code Articles 3224-3226 establish a privilege for ex-
penses of preservation whereby the creditor has a right of re-
12. Id. at 378, 91 So.2d at 572.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
n
° 1012 (8th ed. 1935) ; 2 PLANIOL, TR TA EtMENTAIRE DE DRorr CIVIL no 2404
(11th ed. 1939).
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tention against the owner and a right of preference against other
creditors. The articles do not limit the creditor to services ren-
dered at the request or with the consent of the Owner. Storage
charges are generally accepted to be expenses of preservation.
In re Parking Service, Inc.' looks like a case of hardship
against the owner, but it clarifies the principle that the creditor
has a claim and privilege for storage charges regardless of a re-
quest or consent of the owner for the storage in question. On the
day that the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested a person
accused of a crime, they seized his two automobiles, which they
placed in storage. Later in the same day, the cars were sold to
the present owner, but their release to him was refused because
they were being held by the FBI as evidence. About ten months
later, the owner secured a release order from the federal court,
but he refused to pay the accumulated storage charges.
The court of appeal found that there was no privity of the
owner to any contract for storage and therefore there was no
liability or lien for the charges. 17 In reversing, the Supreme
Court maintained that the FBI had authority "to store the cars
taken by them as evidence at the expense of the owner and with-
out his consent thereto."'18 This might seem to make the decisive
issue whether the person ordering the storage had authority to
do so, and leaves the unasked question why the FBI should not
be responsible for the services which it engages. If the Civil
Code articles are applicable without the request or consent of the
owner, then it should not matter whether the cars were placed
in storage by the authority of the FBI or by a thief who had
stolen them in the first place.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
In matters of acquisitive prescription of ten years, a person
is presumed to possess the full extent of the property described
in his title.' In Agurs v. Holt2 the court held that this presump-
tion can be rebutted. In this case, there was undoubted identi-
16. 232 La. 133, 94 So.2d 7 (1957), reversing 88 So.2d 52 (La. App. 1956).
17. 88 So.2d 52 (La. App. 1956).
1. 232 La. 133, 138, 94 So.2d 7, 9 (1957).
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1. LA. CrVL CODE art. 3498 (1870).
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